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Abstract:  
The recent turn to substantial theories of ‘recognition’ in international relations is of 
considerable interest for the study of international cultural relations. France provides a 
revealing case-study due to the historical importance of culture as such in its foreign policies. 
Its ‘diplomacies of influence’ can be understood as forms of recognition-seeking across 
shifting international ‘regimes of recognition’ (Ringmar). France once played a leading role 
in shaping the global templates for cultural recognition between states. In recent decades, it 
has had to adapt to the terms of new recognition templates established elsewhere, either via 
forms of institutional imitation, or by seeking to inflect these new templates (notably in a self-
ascribed role as global champion of cultural diversity). These dynamics can be traced in a 
series of official reports on France’s external cultural policies, notably across the sectors of 
language policy, arts diplomacy, higher education mobility and global news projection. The 
reports’ deliberation on these processes opens a space for critical discussion concerning the 
contemporary operation of international regimes of recognition. 
Keywords: recognition, international cultural relations, France, cultural diplomacy 
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I will propose the prism of ‘recognition-seeking’ in this article as a way of illuminating 
dynamics in international cultural relations. France provides a useful test-case for this 
approach for at least two reasons. Firstly, it played a pioneering role from the 1870s in the 
institution of cultural instruments for augmenting or preserving international recognition. 
Secondly, the high profile it has given to such instruments means that it ‘reveals’ all the more 
clearly, often in a critical light, the pressures of new global recognitive dynamics that have 
challenged in recent decades its erstwhile dominance. 
Notions of recognition have recently been subject to renewed consideration in general 
international relations theory. Such work has looked to extend its scope beyond the long-
standing preoccupation in international law with the ‘thin’ recognition through which states 
acknowledge each other’s legal existence to the ‘thicker’ forms of recognition predicated on 
deeper mutual knowledge or common purpose.1 Such moves have not as yet been taken up in 
any comprehensive way into the study of international cultural relations. Of course, one could 
say that this latter area of study has, since it first came into being, been concerned with the 
enduring value of ‘thick’ relations of mutual recognition, whether this has been thematised in 
these terms or not. Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power has been highly influential in such 
studies, and Nye himself has, without explicit recourse to notions of recognition, highlighted 
the importance of two-way relations in the effective channelling of such power: 
With soft power, what the target thinks is particularly important, and the targets 
matter as much as the agents. Attraction and persuasion are socially constructed. Soft 
power is a dance that requires partners. (Nye 2011, 84) 
3 
At the same time, and in opposition to some of the term’s more enthusiastic proponents, Nye 
stresses that ‘not all soft power looks so soft to outside critics’ (13), and that there is nothing 
inherently ethical about recourse to such power (‘it is not necessarily better to twist minds 
than to twist arms’ (81)). Likewise, I would like to foreground the harder edges of 
recognition-seeking between states. It may indeed be, as Axel Honneth as suggested, that a 
greater emphasis on the work of mutual recognition would be a pacifying force in world 
politics (Honneth 2010, 194-201). However, to extend in a less irenic direction Nye’s 
metaphor as cited above, there are not necessarily just two equal dancing partners involved in 
such scenes. Who (if any of them) chooses the dance and sets the rhythm? What are the costs 
of refusing to dance, or dancing yesterday’s steps? What if the dance is a competition, a 
struggle for recognition, and you are being judged by a third party? 
Rather than focusing on specific dyads of mutually recognising partners, I would like 
for the purposes of this article to take a more ‘structural’ approach to recognition dynamics. 
For the case in hand, I will examine how globally effective pressures and constraints have 
affected French strategies of recognition-seeking. In order to bring out this globally 
‘structural’ dimension, I will adapt Erik Ringmar’s notion of ‘recognition regimes’: 
Recognition regimes exist in all social systems, including international social systems 
that take states as their subjects. When learning how to recognize another 
international actor, we are guided by the principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures that the recognition regime provides.  Understanding this logic is crucial 
to a state’s survival. Unless political leaders understand another state’s behavior, they 
will not be able to take the necessary precautions. Or, looking at this logic from the 
point of view of the state being recognized, it matters greatly how you present 
yourself to others. Recognition regimes have rules regarding self-presentation. Before 
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we can be recognized, we must make it possible for others to identify us. (Ringmar 
2015, 50)2
I would like to distinguish for the purposes of this article between two broad ‘levels’ of 
recognition regime. Firstly, one can posit ‘generalised’ recognition regimes that govern the 
normative expectations for practices of recognition (and non-recognition) between states. I 
will tentatively sketch out traits of two succeeding generalised regimes of recognition insofar 
as they illuminate the case at hand. I will analyse France’s pioneering strategies to secure 
cultural recognition within a period of ‘restricted international modernity’ (when France 
understood itself as a ‘great power’ belonging to a minority of self-consciously modernising 
states in the world). I will then analyse how these strategies have been refashioned within a 
period of ‘extended international modernity’ (characterised by a proliferation of self-
consciously modernising states and expectations of equal respect).3 These analytic 
constructions are necessarily abstract and provisional, but they are designed at least to 
indicate how particular recognition-seeking strategies are embedded in broader global 
normative structures. 
Secondly, one can posit ‘sectoral’ recognition regimes that inform specific domains of 
inter-state collaboration and competition. These revolve around specific ‘templates’ of 
predefined traits and forms to which a given institution or performance must conform if it is 
to be perceived and to ‘count’ in a given domain of international competition. It is such 
templates that determine the shape that a university, a news channel, or a language must take 
if it is to be recognised as ‘counting’ within particular fields. The forces behind such 
templates are not necessarily individual states as such (they are more likely today to be 
transnational rankings and ratings agencies or intergovernmental bodies). However, these 
templates, which are relatively rigid structures, set the terms for international recognition for 
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particular domains in ways that individual states cannot simply ignore in their self-
presentation. The relations between generalised overarching ‘regimes of recognition’ and 
these domain-specific regimes are best conceived in terms of historically contingent 
assemblages rather than tightly meshed systems (given templates may be put to work in ways 
that do not match the norms of a wider prevailing recognition order). 
This article is a provisional first cut at deploying such a framework. In the 
presentation of France’s pioneering strategies within restricted international modernity, I will 
use material drawn from existing historical accounts. In exploring France’s endeavours to 
adapt to the contemporary conditions of extended international modernity, I will draw on a 
substantial corpus of some 17 official reports extending from 1979 to 2017. The purpose of 
this corpus, as used here, is not to provide a full description of France’s current instruments 
for external cultural action, which can be found elsewhere.4 Rather, I want to trace how the 
normative pressures issuing from contemporary generalised and sectoral recognition regimes 
work their way into the thinking of those groups charged with steering French outward-
directed policies for culture. The evidence for these normative pressures are certain recurrent 
seams of ‘recommendations’ issuing from the reports, which I will highlight as such, while 
also indicating how some of these seams have corresponded to substantial institutional 
reform. The groups in question consist of a wide range of issue-focused elected politicians 
and some public intellectuals, collectively charged with representing certain ‘ideas of 
France’. I concentrate in particular on the key areas of language, arts diplomacy, higher 
education and global news media. 
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France’s pioneering recognitive strategies within restricted international modernity (c. 
1870-1960) 
France was for most of the period 1870-1960 a member of Europe’s and thus (to a decreasing 
extent) the world’s ‘great powers’, but its status as such was increasingly beleaguered. Major 
military defeats and Pyrrhic victories at home and abroad (Franco-Prussian War, World Wars 
I and II, Indochina, Algeria) underscored the decline of its military puissance at the same 
time as they accentuated the comparative waning of its economic standing. It was no 
coincidence that it was drawn precisely over this same period to an emergent ‘cultural’ 
dimension of foreign policies, and indeed that it devised a range of new bodies and 
instruments to institutionalise this dimension.5 This might have been presented as a 
continuation of the kinds of expansionist national rayonnement associated with the ages of 
absolute monarchy or Empire, or the equally expansionist but universalistically cast mission 
issuing from the Revolution. But it also served as a form of damage-limitation, helping to 
maintain a profile and a presence as a recognisable great power even if other attributes 
associated with such status were increasingly insecure. 
France was in effect playing the suit in which its cards were strongest. For reasons to 
do more with the consolidated dynamics of various artistic fields than with intentional 
government policies, Paris was for much of the period widely viewed as the centre and 
cutting edge of the visual arts world (Chaubet and Martin 2011, 25-33), and the ‘Greenwich 
Meridian’ of world literature (Casanova 2004). Especially in the decades after World War II, 
it appeared as the breeding ground for the boldest new ideas in philosophy and the human 
sciences (existentialism, structuralism, and what appeared to the outside world as 
poststructuralism). Its language maintained in many spheres its dominant or co-dominant 
status, not least as a gateway to the artistic and intellectual productions just mentioned 
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(though some date the beginnings of its eclipse from 1919, when the Versailles treaty was 
drafted in English as well as French). The turn to a cultural component of foreign policy was 
not a purely administrative device designed to generate energy ex nihilo, but could capitalise 
on the uncommon vitality and international profile of an interlocking set of artistic fields. It 
looked to channel and amplify the energy of a current that was already in flow. 
There were thus powerful motivations both positive and negative which induced 
France to foreground a dimension of foreign policy which up to that point had received 
relatively little concerted reflection or institutional attention. It was this that led it to work as 
a pioneer in the development of an apparatus for international cultural projection. By the 
second half of the twentieth century, France had acquired an unparalleled array of classic 
cultural diplomacy tools. These had accumulated in so many layers: schools abroad since the 
end of the nineteenth century; university exchanges and an expansion of cultural institutes 
since the beginning of the twentieth century; book donations and lecture tours since the 
1920s, following the example of the Alliance Française founded in 1883 as a private 
organisation nonetheless aligned with the Republic’s cultural and linguistic aims; an 
emphasis on theatrical tours, travelling art exhibitions and film projections after 1945 
(Chaubet and Martin 2011, 89). There was also a dedicated culture department within the 
Foreign Ministry, which assumed a particularly significant dimension after 1945 with the 
introduction of a ‘General Directorate for Cultural Relations’ (absorbing nearly 50% of the 
Foreign Ministry budget by 1968 (Vaïsse 2009, ch. 9)). Finally, one should not forget, 
towards the very end of this period, the ‘invention’ of the first Ministry for Cultural Affairs in 
the Western democratic world, which André Malraux would use as a base for some resonant 
international gestures and pronouncements, and which would eventually become a staple 
component of governmental organigrams in democracies across the world. Indeed, Malraux 
would try unsuccessfully to turn this new Ministry into the nation’s prime instrument of 
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international cultural projection, inaugurating a boundary-defining competition with the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs that has resurfaced intermittently since.6
In an international context where only a restricted number of countries recognised 
each other as modern major powers, France worked as a precursor to fashion the templates 
informing regimes of recognition played out with increasing deliberateness on cultural fronts. 
De Gaulle himself was notoriously hard-headed from the early 1940s about the underlying 
weakness of France’s position, and thus about the importance of what for other contemporary 
leaders would have appeared as ‘softer’ instruments of international leverage (Frank 2012a, 
376; Larkin 1991, 111, 120)  Historians have suggested that this long-term strategy did pay 
some dividends, attributing the allocation of a place on the UN Security Council to France’s 
residual cultural sway with Latin American voting countries (Chaubet and Martin 2011, 121). 
Likewise France was able to propose Paris as the quasi-natural home for UNESCO in 1946 
(Singh 2011; Maurel 2010). However, as developments in both the UN and UNESCO would 
highlight in subsequent decades, the world order was about to change significantly, and with 
it the regimes of recognition at work in globalised cultural domains. 
The political and technological conditions of new recognition regimes (c. 1970 to the 
present) 
The first factor changing the generalised conditions of inter-state recognition was doubtless 
the sheer increase in the number of self-consciously modernising and mutually 
communicating states in existence across the world. This was reflected in the membership of 
the United Nations (51 member states in 1945, 99 in 1960, 144 in 1975, 188 in 1999, and 193 
in 2018), as well as UNESCO. The main drivers of this increase were, of course, the waves of 
decolonisation from the 1950s to the 1970s, and then the new nations emerging in the 
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aftermath of the Cold War from the 1990s. Moreover, the demise of the Cold War’s 
structurally simplifying zones of influence paved the way for the atomised multiplicity of the 
contemporary world order. Two initial effects flow from these changes as regards the 
conditions for inter-state recognition. Firstly, with so many more players in the recognition 
game, it becomes much harder for any one player (putting to one side the one or two mega-
players) to secure the attention of others. Secondly, the move to an extended rather than 
restricted order of international modernity makes it much harder for former powers to justify 
any apparently privileged position, particularly if they do not have materially backed 
capacities to force an issue. Such erstwhile great powers, having become middle powers 
(‘puissances moyennes’), are obliged to present themselves in terms of a new space of 
justifications, as assumptions of deference yield to a rhetoric of utility. 
Secondly, the relative ‘democratisation’ of relations between states was accompanied 
by a relative if uneven democratisation of conditions within most states. This gave greater 
potency to the views and affinities of ‘civil societies’ in relation to governing authorities, and 
indeed gave societies as such the capacity to enter into relation with other societies and their 
products without necessarily passing via their own governments. In this regard, as is well 
known, international relations became as much wider ‘inter-society’ relations as 
intergovernmental and inter-elite relations (Badie 2016; Frank 2012b). This changes the 
strategic calculus of cultural influence. Recognition of one’s refinement or avant-garde 
credentials by an elite must be weighed against the attraction to one’s symbolic wares or 
ways of life of wider populations, which has come to operate on an altogether larger scale 
and in terms of very different templates. 
Thirdly, the rules of contemporary international recognition regimes have been 
radically transformed by a series of technological upheavals. On the one hand, these have 
been produced by what we might call after Debray a series of ‘mediological’ revolutions 
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(radio, television, internet) (Debray 1991). Such technologies of transmission have operated 
not simply as neutral conduits for the more efficient processing of identical messages and 
patterns of projection. Instead they have created new ecosystems in which some artistic 
genres and symbolic styles flourish while others perish, wither away, or simply lose 
comparative potency. At the same time, there has been a proliferation of what we might call, 
after Foucault, transnational ‘technologies of government’. Particularly relevant among these, 
for our purposes, are the multiple data-based ranking systems which calibrate, according to 
expressly constructed templates, national performances across broadly cultural domains such 
as education, attractivity, cultural import and export, brand salience and so forth. These are 
not necessarily produced by governmental agencies, but when they ‘lock in’ as a shared 
reference, they start to impose new terms for state strategies in recognition-seeking. 
Within this new, multiply determined assemblage of recognition regimes, France can 
no longer figure as a ‘great power’, and nor can it assume as it once did a pre-established 
cultural eminence. Certainly, the aspiration towards grandeur persists in the national debate 
as a kind of ingrained conatus (the tendency, according to Spinoza, of entities to ‘persevere in 
their being’): thus the former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing has taken to 
describing the nation as a ‘great middle power’ (une grande puissance moyenne). Despite its 
involuntarily comic effect, this collocation is a useful guide for understanding some of the 
tensions and challenges involved in France’s adaptation to a new symbolic order. On the one 
hand, we can read in such adaptations anxious attempts at status maintenance, informed all 
the while by the awareness that this status is diminishing, and that the nation’s erstwhile 
achievements are no longer recognised. On the other hand, we can also discern endeavours to 
carve out a new kind of profile for itself, a particular way of playing the role of a ‘middle 
power’ (like all roles, this role could be performed ‘greatly’ or poorly). Putting aside the 
populations of China, India and the USA, one might say that the majority of the world’s 
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population will soon be living under greater or lesser ‘middle powers’. In this respect, it can 
be instructive to consider how one particular middle power, somewhat haunted by ideas about 
its own exemplariness and equipped with a heightened self-consciousness around cultural 
policy, has endeavoured to negotiate the changing waters of global cultural recognition. 
Chasing recognition: France’s contemporary instruments of influence 
Transforming strategies for cultural projection is not as straightforward as putting a hammer 
back in the toolbox and taking out a screwdriver adjusted to the job. Agents are invested in 
the instruments they have learned to use, and indeed they have fashioned themselves as 
instruments of a certain sort in their own right. There is thus a fair degree of hysteresis at 
work in the fields of cultural diplomacy and influence – that is, the deployment of schemes 
internalised in one set of historical circumstances in the context of a later set of circumstances 
in which they no longer fit.7 This is not necessarily bad: agents can have good reasons to 
remain attached to these schemes, and the present need not be the measure of all things. 
However, as regards the analysis we are conducting here, evidence has accumulated over 
decades that France’s erstwhile cultural strategies have misfired in the context of newly 
prevailing regimes of recognition. We will explore in this section how this has led to a diffuse 
endeavour to refashion the nation’s instruments and rationales for cultural projection across 
four domains: language policy; arts policies; the international dimension of higher education; 
global news production. 
For tracing both the residual existence of former schemes of perception and the 
gradual collective fashioning of new instruments and rationales, I have gathered a corpus of 
some 17  reports, spanning the period 1979 to 2017, and focusing on French outward-directed 
culture and language policies  (Rigaud 1979; Bloche 1998; Tavernier 2000; Duvernois 2004; 
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Schneider and Rochebloine 2007; Védrine 2007; Juppé and Schweitzer 2008; Legendre and 
de Rohan 2009; Kristeva 2009; Colot and Rochebloine 2010; Loncle and Schmid 2013; 
Amirshahi and Rochebloine 2014; Attali 2014; Mancel, Terrasse, and Marsac 2015; Baumel 
and Guibal 2015; Jahshan 2016; Duvernois and Lepage 2017). Most of these are reports by 
the standing Foreign Affairs or Culture commissions of the National Assembly or the Senate, 
but the corpus also contains some ad hoc specially commissioned and often high-profile 
reports (Rigaud, Bloche, Juppé, Vedrine, Attali), as well as two reports by the Economic, 
Social and Environmental Council (Kristeva, Jahshan). While the reports may be attached to 
the name of a rapporteur or chair, most are collectively researched and produced. Moreover, 
they tend to be the work of long-term parliamentary or Senate ‘specialists’ who are 
particularly invested in the issues, along with a handful of high-profile ex-ministers or public 
intellectuals. This is not, of course, a demographically representative sample, but it is a 
significant sample insofar as such agents are officially positioned at strategic nexuses within 
policy-elaborating processes, and are offically charged with ‘representing’ a certain idea of 
the nation. The commissions in question are not directly tied to the executive, and are cross-
partisan, which allows for a certain freedom of manoeuvre in pointing up gaps and 
deficiencies across policies (as Hubert Védrine has noted, divisions on French foreign and 
globalisation policies do not in any case follow conventional left-right lines (2007, 31)). In 
many ways they constitute an ideal terrain on which to pick up changing attitudes to French 
cultural projection and the gradual but not uncritical alignment of such attitudes with the 
overall recognition regimes at work in the wider world. As noted above, I am particularly 
interested in the normative pressure exerted by such forces insofar as this is evidenced by 
recurrent thematic seams in the recommendations proposed by the reports (I will indicate also 
how some such recommendations have worked their way into recent major institutional 
reforms). 
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A number of general leitmotifs run through the corpus as a whole. There is an 
increasing awareness, after Jacques Rigaud’s seminal report of 1979, that the domain of 
cultures and languages across the world is a site of ever-increasing ‘competition’ between 
states and also other entities (Duvernois and Lepage 2017, 19). There are the worries that 
other nations are not only ‘imitating’ the templates or methods France initially invented, but 
are overtaking it and inventing new methods  (Rigaud 1979, 17; Kristeva 2009, 12). There is 
the insistent anxiety that France’s inherited cultural and linguistic positions are not only 
fragile but ‘ambiguous’ (Kristeva, 7) and often unjustifiable (Schneider and Rochebloine 
2007, 21-2), and that new modes of self-presentation are required. We will trace the work of 
these concerns across our four related domains. 
Language Policy and Francophonie
Rigaud already in 1979 was urging his readers not simply to accept that France had indeed 
long lost the struggle to be the world’s dominant language to global English, but to realise 
also that it was counterproductive to imagine the future of French only in terms of a dyadic 
relationship with English (Rigaud 1979, 18, 39). Twenty years later, we find Bloche 
repeating the message, and indeed asserting that it must continue to be ‘tirelessly repeated’, 
as a widespread but now wounded ‘mystique’ attached to the French language itself inhibited 
policy reflection (Bloche 1998, 11, 85-6). Nonetheless, we see emerging over the course of 
the corpus a consolidated realisation that the language’s former status was based on 
recognition regimes endowing it with a ‘privileged status among [other nations’] elites, in 
domains as varied as diplomacy, law, sport, and obviously arts and literature’ (Schneider and 
Rochebloine 2007, 15). It was no good adopting simply a ‘plaintive’ attitude (Amirshahi and 
Rochebloine 2014, 10) as this status was eroded in various global forums. Instead, a new 
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justificatory frame for the language’s global significance had to be articulated. We can 
discern three broad moves at work across the corpus in this regard. 
Firstly, France is urged to relinquish exclusive ownership of one of its defining 
attributes (Tavernier 2000, 16; Duvernois and Lepage 2017, 23). The language is no longer to 
be defined by France as its orthodox ‘centre’, but instead in collaboration with its 
francophone partners (with a recurrent trope being the forecast of a shift in its ‘centre of 
gravity’ within a few decades to Africa (Baumel and Guibal 2015, 160; Amirshahi and 
Rochebloine 2014, 17)). Francophonie has of course quite a venerable history as a somewhat 
sprawling institutional entity. It was launched in the 1960s by a handful of newly independent 
African leaders (with de Gaulle reluctant to become actively involved for fear of neo-colonial 
associations), and assumed clearer political shape from the 1980s, with its various operators 
coming under the direction of a coordinating agency named from 2005 the Organisation 
Internationale de la Francophonie (Deniau 2001; Mancel, Terrasse, and Marsac 2015, 13-
22). The term is used in the corpus to refer either to this institutional archipelago or to the 
sociolinguistic reality of French speakers across the world (the OIF now contains 84 state 
adherents, but many of these have a rather questionable attachment to French, and it does not 
contain Algeria, which holds the second largest number of French speakers in the world after 
France). A proposal which gains traction in the corpus is that France should take a more 
active role in defining an ‘inner core’ of francophone countries (numbering around 30) where 
either French is an official language or more than 20% of the population speak French 
(Amirshahi and Rochebloine 2014, 13; Duvernois and Lepage 2017, 43). In other words, it 
should recognise the real geopolitical frontiers of its language, and also the multiple loci of 
sovereign authority within those frontiers. 
The reports note recurrent resistance  to such proposals. Within France, they point to 
opposing but self-reinforcing arguments that, on the one hand, France itself is the authorised 
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guardian of its language (Duvernois and Lepage 2017, 23), and, on the other hand, that to 
promote French abroad is indeed a neo-colonial impulse (Tavernier 2000, 17). At the same 
time, the reports anticipate resistance abroad to a project aiming to promote French for its 
own sake. Thus, in a second broad move, they turn to a championing of multilingualism 
(Duvernois and Lepage 2017, 20). There are bluntly pragmatic considerations behind this. In 
the context of the EU, the promotion of French as a foreign language in other countries’ 
education systems is a lost cause unless pupils learn a second foreign language in addition to 
English. Thus France has been keen to promote ‘plurilinguism’ within the EU, notably 
through the ‘one plus two’ model for foreign language learning adopted as an official EU 
‘priority’ in Barcelona in 2002 (Schneider and Rochebloine 2007, 39). In the context of 
Africa, the key variable in the spread of French is also its take-up in education (though here 
with the issue being education in French rather than of French). The optimistic projections in 
some quarters that French might have as many as 770 million speakers by 2060 (Attali 2014, 
53) are predicated on the massive spread of basic and secondary education across Africa in 
the coming decades, and on the proposition that much of that education will take place in 
French (as Baumel notes across his report on francophone Africa, neither premise can be 
taken at all for granted (Baumel and Guibal 2015, 40-2, 91-8)). Yet here as well, the 
objectives shift from an exclusive promotion of French to the cultivation of a multilinguistic 
framework within which French can find a place. It would be unacceptable, in terms of the 
generalised contemporary protocols of cultural recognition, for France to set itself up in direct 
competition with the multiple local and (sub)national languages of Africa.8 Instead, current 
programmes like School and National Languages (ELAN), designed to promote bilingual 
teaching capacity in francophone Africa, are conceived in terms of managing relations 
between local languages and a global language in the context of a multilingual educational 
experience  (Amirshahi and Rochebloine 2014, 23-4). 
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The theme of multilingualism comes also to be treated in more expansive terms in the 
reports, being celebrated as a second-order value in its own right over and beyond its 
invocation as an expedient dictated by necessity. Thus Amirshahi, in the context of 
deliberations in international forums, invokes broad potential alliances based on mutual 
recognition between the ‘Xphonias’ of the world (hispanophonia, lusophonia, 
germanophonia…) as a way of resisting the intellectual impoverishment of monolingual 
deliberation (Amirshahi and Rochebloine 2014, 97). Likewise Julia Kristeva suggests that we 
see  ‘translation’, being a ‘stranger within a language’ and ‘polyphony’ as ‘fundamental 
human experiences’, and argues that the assertive defence of French as an accumulated 
capital on which others can draw is a valuable contribution to this newly conceived global 
good of linguistic diversity (Kristeva 2009, 11, 36). In Joseph Nye’s terms, this might be seen 
as the integration of French language policy within a ‘global public good narrative’ (Nye 
2011, 221). We will develop further in the next subsection the repositioning of French 
cultural projection in the context of the more general ‘recognition’ of cultural diversity. 
The third broad move made across the corpus is to underline the importance of the 
language’s bottom-line ‘usefulness’. Its status has long rested on a quasi-automatic cultural 
recognition, but reports stress that this ‘privilege’ can no longer be taken for granted 
(Schneider and Rochebloine 2007, 21), and that even where the aura it enjoyed in a previous 
recognition regime survives, it may have little effect on the linguistic choices made by new 
generations and wider populations. The situation in this respect is thus compared indirectly, 
and also often directly, to a ‘market’ where the French language is a ‘product’ that must show 
its worth in terms of economic access and social mobility (Schneider and Rochebloine 2007, 
57; Baumel and Guibal 2015, 161; Duvernois and Lepage 2017, 19). 
Beyond these three moves specific to the language policy domain, the reports also 
negotiate the twin concerns of external readability and rankability, which we will find again 
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across the other domains considered here. We can see both concerns as direct symptoms of 
international ‘regimes of recognition’ at work. Tavernier worries in 2000 that the 
‘francophone’ label attaching to various dispersed initiatives does not impose respect (it is 
‘postiche’, like an unconvincing wig); Kristeva in 2009 thinks that the Organisation 
Internationale de la Francophonie needs a more arresting common logo if it is to be 
perceived within the general flux of global communications. Assuming the institutions of 
French as a global language are indeed perceived and recognised in the first place, there is 
then the attendant anxiety as to the language’s subsequent ‘ranking’ among other established 
and emerging global languages. This ranking starts to take on a more scientifically elaborate 
quality over the timespan of the corpus, and is on its way to becoming quite a mature domain-
specific regime of recognition in its own right. Duvernois refers to the pyramidic 
classificatory systems of world languages developed around the turn of the millennium by 
Graddol and de Swaan (the latter places French, amidst a handful of other languages, as a 
‘supercentral’ language beneath the ‘hypercentral language’ of global English and above the 
‘peripheral‘ and ‘central’ - usually national -  languages making up the vast bulk of the 
world’s idioms) (de Swaan 2001; Graddol 2000). The French linguist Louis-Jean Calvet has 
more recently adopted an apparatus for comparing the ‘weight’ of different languages in a 
global context. This has the scientific advantage (as do those of Graddol and de Swaan) of 
going beyond the raw comparison of native or fluent speakers. It also has the political 
advantage of extensive customisability. It allows the ‘weight’ or coefficient attributed to 
different factors to be adjusted between zero and one, thus allowing users to assign different 
kinds of importance to issues such as numbers of native speakers, vehicularity, internet 
presence, numbers of international literary prizes awarded, dispersion across states, etc. 
(Calvet and Calvet 2013). One can understand the attractiveness of Calvet’s apparatus for 
advocates of the French language in the world, as it allows them to calibrate more than is 
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sometimes possible the ‘terms of recognition’ governing the proposed status of the language. 
Indeed the OIF’s Observatoire de la langue française takes up a set of Calvet’s criteria as a 
way of proposing a ‘label’ that would recognise some languages officially as ‘world 
languages’ (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie 2014, 33; Duvernois and Lepage 
2017, 12). We see here francophone agents both engaging with the new ‘regimes of 
recognition’ shaping perceptions in the contemporary world, and trying at the same time to 
inflect those regimes. 
Artistic Expressions: Instituts Français and UNESCO
For much of the twentieth century, as already noted, French artistic culture was seen as 
internationally pre-eminent across multiple genres (visual arts, literature, philosophy, 
cinema). This ensured Paris’s ongoing ‘undisputed’ status as a global ‘cultural junction and 
site for the recognition of talent’ (Rigaud 1979, 63).9 Even outside Paris, the aura of this 
artistic scene stretched out to the most ramshackle film showing or improvised lecture tour 
across the world (Chaubet and Martin 2011, 125). With the ebb of the belief in France as the 
incarnation of the global avant-garde (itself largely a symptom of the erosion of the belief 
that world culture even has something like an avant-garde or cutting edge), the ectoplasmic 
waters sustaining that aura have withdrawn. This is often experienced inside and outside the 
nation as the ‘death of French culture’, to cite a polemical book whose title is mentioned by 
various reports (Morrison and Compagnon 2010; cited at Legendre and de Rohan 2009, 7; 
Kristeva 2009, 15) – though it actually has almost nothing to do with the intrinsic vitality or 
otherwise of French artistic and intellectual life, which would belong to a different 
discussion. If the phrase nevertheless rings true at a certain level, it is because it describes the 
‘mortifying’ experience of a relatively abrupt withdrawal of recognition. Thus Paris now has 
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to fight for its place in an ever more intense competition among the capitals of the world 
(Kristeva 2009, 65).10 And reports recurrently describe a network of cultural centres and 
institutes across the world as suffering from an ‘ambient malaise’ and a pervasive crisis in 
confidence (Duvernois 2004, 76). Inherited from previous cultural epochs, this vast material 
infrastructure, whose extent is often described as ‘unique in the world’, appears often to be 
bereft of a sustaining ‘raison d’être’ (Colot and Rochebloine 2010, 29).11
The responses developed across the reports and integrated in due course into policy 
have worked to draw France into contemporary cultural diplomacy’s prevailing regimes of 
recognition. Without the unifying charge of a strongly identified body of content, the diverse 
array of France’s cultural institutes, centres and ambassadorial cultural services came to seem 
dispersed, motley and ‘unreadable’. This accounts for the move consolidated in the major 
2010 law on the State’s ‘external action’, which brought all France’s cultural outposts under a 
common identity (Lane 2016, ch. 2).12 There was some hesitation over the best name, ranging 
from proper names such as ‘Victor Hugo’ institutes to a proposal to merge this network with 
that of the semi-official Alliance Française under the latter’s name (Colot and Rochebloine 
2010, 42). The abiding concern, however, was always to endow France’s ‘network’ with a 
recognisability that could compete on the terms already established by the strongly unified 
entities that populated the field (the British Council, the Goethe Institute, Confucius 
Institutes…). In the end, the name adopted was the Institut Français, which designates both 
the central ‘operator’ established in Paris to oversee arts projection and exchange, and the 
actual institutes located overseas. Of course, this administrative and brand realignment has 
not ended the diffuse malaise diagnosed amidst a network whose methods were elaborated 
under different recognition regimes and earlier mediological conditions. A report in 2013 
acknowledged the ‘dynamism’ behind the arts promotion at work in the network (it 
reportedly produced 5 times more events than the Goethe Institute and 20 times more than the 
20 
British Council). However, that same report suggested there was something frenetic and 
‘febrile’ about this promotion, with all the ‘agitation’ producing limited results in terms of 
enduring ‘visibility’ (Loncle and Schmid 2013, 43). Likewise, reports have argued that the 
extensive and unrivalled material infrastructure of imposing buildings, once the pride of 
France abroad, may have left the network flat-footed for an age where so much cultural 
exchange has become ‘dematerialised’ and virtual (Juppé and Schweitzer 2008, 93; Loncle 
and Schmid 2013, 46-7). 
The reports increasingly seek to articulate a different cultural diplomacy role for 
France, given that its network can no longer content itself with supplying a content imbued 
with its own justificatory aura. This tends to revolve around a style of presence in the world 
setting out to be ‘mediatory’ rather than ‘imperialistic’ (Duvernois 2004, 11, 45). Indeed, for 
Kristeva, France does indeed have a ‘message of substance’ for the world, but of a second-
order nature (that is, transcending any particular cultural content): it is based on its long-term 
advocacy for the importance of nations’ cultural policies as such, and its more recent embrace 
for the twin values of ‘diversity’ and ‘translatability’ (Kristeva 2009, 8-12, 34). The reports 
often celebrate in this context France’s ‘pioneering’ role as national policy entrepreneur in 
the process culminating in the ratification in 2005 of UNESCO’s ‘Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions’. This Convention was, of 
course, a ‘recognitive’ collective act in its own right – it revolved quite explicitly around the 
‘recognition’ of the world’s cultural diversity as a collective good, and of nations’ rights to 
uphold cultural policies that maintain their share in that diversity. The ambiguities and limits 
of the Convention have been amply discussed elsewhere (for an ironic perspective from a 
French cultural diplomacy insider, see Olivier Poivre d’Arvor (2011, ch. 8)). From our 
perspective in this article, we can note how the persistent reference to the Convention allows 
France to straddle, somewhat ambivalently, different epochs in the regimes of international 
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recognition. In so doing, an older singular French rhetoric of cultural ‘exceptionalism’ has 
become overlaid by a newer global discursive template of cultural diversity  (for an early 
instance of this move, see Trautmann 2002). France’s ‘initiative’ in this respect symbolises 
its departure from the old schemes of imperialistic rayonnement – but, as this passage from 
the start of Legendre’s report suggests, it preserves at another level, through its very self-
positioning as a ‘champion’ of mediation, the satisfactions of a reframed rayonnement: 
If it is doubtless excessive to evoke France’s cultural and linguistic rayonnement
abroad as a substitute for the loss of military and economic power, the adoption in 
October 2005 of the UNESCO Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions, drawn up on the initiative of France, illustrates all 
the importance attached by our country to its cultural diplomacy (Legendre and de 
Rohan 2009, 7) 
The writer perhaps betrays despite himself the importance of ‘importance’ for the ‘great 
middle power’ that is France, and the attendant self-expectations that persist from one epoch 
of recognition to the next. 
Higher Education and Global News 
For all the differences between the two sectors of higher education and global news, we can 
see analogous moves across both domains to mesh French platforms with prevailing regimes 
of recognition which largely failed to register the nation’s prior historically established 
institutions. We thus see the reports recommending and then endorsing the remodelling of 
these institutions in terms of the templates established elsewhere in the world, while 
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demonstrating intermittently acute anxieties regarding the preservation of a distinctive French 
identity in the context of such alignment. 
Higher education has long represented for France a channel for international 
influence. Although it tends to come around fourth in international tables based on volumes 
of foreign students (after the US, the UK and Australia), it is not quite in the same ‘market’ as 
those three countries. As Kristeva notes, the low level of university fees tend to mean that 
foreign students figure as a ‘cost’ rather than a source of profit in direct accounting terms, 
and thus can be understood in terms of a policy of influence and/or development rather than 
as a contribution to the economy (Kristeva 2009, 44). Moreover, some 50% of these students 
come from francophone Africa, where France does indeed dominate the field (Amirshahi and 
Rochebloine 2014, 129). Nonetheless, as the volume and importance of the global 
marketplace in higher education has become ever greater, we see expressed over the course 
of our corpus the worry that France’s higher education provision has become invisible, 
unrateable or provincialised. 
One abiding concern is that France’s higher education system is too complex, 
idiosyncratic and fragmented to be understood adequately from abroad either by human 
beings, search engines or data-ordering agencies (Bloche 1998, 44-53; Kristeva 2009, 44-5). 
An initial response has been to set up a single ‘shop window’ operator with a clear identity 
rather as happened with the Institut Français (the iteration of this agency set up by the 
aforementioned 2010 law is called CampusFrance). This may give the system a recognisable 
interface with students abroad, but it does not help with France’s near invisibility in the most 
influential higher education league tables such as the Shanghai or the Times Higher 
Education university rankings. This is because such tables are engineered to ‘recognise’ elite 
institutions shaped according to the template of classic anglo-saxon research universities. In 
France, the highest performing students in many sectors do not even go to ‘universities’ as 
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such, but to the ‘grandes écoles’, or elite teaching colleges, which may not specialise in 
research; while much leading research has traditionally taken part in dedicated research 
institutes without significant quantities of students. There has been a major concerted 
legislative and budgetary endeavour over the last 15 years to merge grandes écoles, 
universities and other higher education institutes, and to mesh these with existing research 
agencies so as to create new (very unwieldy) mega-institutions (Musselin 2017). The 
principal motivation for so doing has been to create nominal ‘universities’ that can indeed be 
recognised as such by international ranking agencies. 
On the one hand, within our corpus, such moves, giving greater autonomy to 
expanded and more ‘university-like’ entities, are seen as a necessary step in the contemporary 
higher education order (Kristeva 2009, 45-6). On the other hand, there is much anxiety and a 
degree of disagreement on the extent to which such institutional mimeticism will erode the 
very features that make France recognisable as France.13 While authors are happy to endorse 
the projection of French brands like the ‘Sorbonne’ abroad, they are less happy to find anglo-
saxon brands insinuating their way into France itself (‘the Toulouse School of Economics’) 
(Amirshahi and Rochebloine 2014, 56). Key disagreements focus on the 2013 Fioraso law 
allowing courses to be taught under certain conditions in English – is this a necessary step in 
the attraction of global talent (Kristeva 2009, 46; Attali 2014, 35), or a surrendering precisely 
of one of France’s sources of attraction and competitive advantage (Amirshahi and 
Rochebloine 2014, 55-8)? 
We can see a similar dynamic, along with similar anxieties, in the process leading to 
the founding in 2006 of France 24, the nation’s own television channel for global news. I 
have analysed this process at length elsewhere (Ahearne 2014, 121-51), and so will here 
simply pick out the most relevant aspects for the present discussion. There was for long a 
hesitation about adopting for France’s own purposes what came commonly to be called a 
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‘French-style CNN’ (Bloche 1998, 140). This appellation itself captures something of the 
initial ambivalence of French elites in relation to such a venture, given that France already 
had a well established international radio service (RFI) and had been prime funder, since the 
1980s, of a multilateral francophone television channel (TV5). Yet after the turn of the 
millennium (and particularly around the time of the Iraq War in 2003), it became clear to a 
succession of French presidents and foreign secretaries that France had become too 
‘invisible’ and inaudible on the global media scene. Its established radio network was of 
limited use for the image-driven dynamics of the global videosphere, and the very 
multilateralism of TV5 inhibited its use as a platform for French projection as such (there 
were thus limits to the multilateralism that France was energetically pursuing across other 
domains). Chirac and his foreign minister Villepin expressly wanted an organ that could 
compete with CNN, the BBC and Al Jazeera (even if these were not direct governmental 
tools), and also channels launched by other powers like Russia, Iran and China. France was 
arriving quite late to this particular game, and would have to adapt to the institutional and 
stylistic templates already established by other players. The slow and quite painful emergence 
of France 24 is nonetheless endorsed by reports in the corpus as allowing France to 
overcome the fragmentation and ‘unreadability’ of its outward-facing media apparatus, and to 
acquire a recognisable voice within the global public sphere (Duvernois 2004, 80-1, 98-108). 
Indeed, the emergence of France 24 accounts for one of the few clear rises in State spending 
on outward-directed policies for culture in the last decade, as the requirement to catch up with 
competitor states became inescapable.14
Such anxieties as subsequently emerged tended again to revolve around the extent to 
which the institutional mimeticism in question would erode those clusters of features that 
made a French identity recognisable as such. Thus Sarkozy originally refused to countenance 
the idea of publicly funding a news channel that would broadcast in anything but French, 
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before having to concede to his foreign minister Kouchner that multilingual broadcasting was 
the only way (as Kouchner hubristically put it) to ‘conquer the narration of the world’ 
(Kouchner 2007). Likewise its first director proposed that he would organise France 24’s 
provision around the four basic ‘entry points’ bringing viewers to global news channels 
(security, the economy, weather and sport) but would supplement this with a fifth element 
(culture and art de vivre) with the aim of giving a French twist to the global formula (Blet 
2008, 196). We see here with particular clarity the two-step process of template adoption and 
marginal distinction that characterises the formal dynamic through which nations today 
internalise international domain-specific regimes of recognition. 
Conclusion 
France is by no means a typical nation as regards the issues discussed in this article, but 
neither is it as ‘exceptional’ as it has sometimes portrayed itself to be. It has, as a collective 
agent, placed an unusually high emphasis on culture as part of its international profile – but 
culture itself has in recent decades become increasingly prominent as a stake in inter-state 
relations more generally. Moreover, the templates underpinning the cultural dimensions of 
those relations have been radically remodelled, across areas as diverse as language policies, 
arts diplomacy, higher education student mobility and global news projection (to cite just the 
four considered in this article). France’s attachment to and insistence on its cultural 
singularity makes it all the more striking as a ‘revealer’ for the gravitational pull of the new 
international regimes of recognition to which it is subject. Its intermittent anxieties and 
discontent about the operation of these regimes, as expressed across the various commissions 
of its national representatives cited above, are also fertile in their own right. It has, often 
slowly and with quite a high degree of self-consciousness, negotiated paths between the 
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mimetic adaptation to global templates and the preservation of its own distinguishing 
features. It has also channelled, albeit somewhat ambiguously, some of its earlier aspirations 
for rayonnement (a libido radiandi) into a role as a champion for the recognition of cultural 
diversity. And its ongoing deliberations open a space where we can ask critical questions 
about the recognition of regimes of recognition. 
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Notes 
1 On legal recognition, see Kelsen 1941; for the distinction between thin and thick 
recognition, see Wendt 2003, pp. 511-12; for overviews of the turn to recognition in the study 
of international relations, see the edited collections by Agné et al. (2013), Daase et al. (2015), 
and Lindemann & Ringmar (2016). 
2 Alternative terms for approaching the structural dimension of recognition practices are Axel 
Honneth’s ‘recognition orders’ (Anerkennungsordnungen) (e.g. Fraser and Honneth 2003, 
135-60), though Honneth does not apply this specifically to interstate relations, or Ringmar’s 
own ‘recognition game’ (2002). 
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3 I borrow and adapt the terms of ‘restricted’ and ‘extended’ modernities from Wagner 
(1994). 
4 See e.g. Lane 2016 or 2013. 
5 On culture as a ‘fourth dimension’ of foreign policy, see Coombs (1964). 
6 See e.g. Vaisse 2009, ch.9; Martin 2010; and also note 12 below. 
7 On hysteresis, see Bourdieu (1979, 158). 
8 On the hypercomplex linguistic landscape of Africa and its relations to French (often an 
official, vehicular or educational language due to its bridging capacity within or across 
fragmented and overlapping linguistic patchworks), see Calvet (2010). 
9 For a long historical perspective, see Charle (2009). 
10 For an extensive overview of competition and imitation among the capitals of the world, 
see Therborn (2017). 
11 France has traditionally invested significant sums in its cultural diplomacy network, with 
Bry noting a thirteen-fold real-terms increase between 1950 and 1990 in the overall budget 
for the Foreign Ministry’s cultural department (to 5 billion francs) (Bry 1999, 251-254). 
More recently, the budget effectively available for the network itself has come under duress 
given generalised constraints on public spending, although its precise evolution is not 
straightforward to track. There is a separate programme (P185) for ‘cultural diplomacy’ 
within the new national accounting system introduced in 2006, which was originally designed 
to hold all related expenditure headings (in practice, some significant cognate items feature in 
other budget programmes related to actions for international development, research, or, most 
substantially, audiovisual policy, which will be discussed below). The sums available for this 
programme can appear at first view to have remained relatively buoyant between 2006 and 
2018,  moving from 519 million euros in 2006 to 595 in 2010, 759 in 2011, 749 in 2013, and 
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718 in 2018 (figures taken from the Loi de Finances Initiale budget breakdowns available at 
https://www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr/). However, more than half of this sum is 
devoted to France’s network of schools abroad, and detailed commentaries show how the 
constant overall levels mask declines in funding at ground level, as significant proportions of 
the budget following 2010 were taken up with the structural reforms associated with the 
major reforms of that year, while Programme 185 has more recently started to include credits 
attributed to tourism policy (Cour des comptes 2013, 27-33; Duvernois 2015, 10).  
Nonetheless, overall credits attributed to cultural diplomacy and projection remain high by 
international standards, with the Cour des Comptes estimating that these amounted, when 
taking all relevant headings including media into account, to 1.339 billion euros in 2013, 
compared to 0.48 billion for the UK and 1.6 billion for Germany (when central and federal 
contributions were aggregated for the latter) (2013, 29). 
12 The effect of this law was to transfer practical responsibility for sectors of outward-facing 
culture policies to dedicated ‘operators’ (the Institut Français, CampusFrance, and France 
Expertise), to which one might add previously existing distinct operators for areas such as 
schooling abroad or external media. The Foreign Affairs ministry retains responsibility for 
overall strategy and nearly all funding, though a number of other Ministries, notably the 
Ministry for Culture and Communication, are also involved to a lesser degree in the funding 
and co-direction of specific sectors and actions (for a tabular breakdown, see Cour des 
Comptes, 2013, 28). A recent further instance of turf wars between Foreign and Culture 
ministries concerned responsibility for international dimensions of ‘commercial’ cultural 
industries, which were finally withheld from the responsibilities of the Institut Français in 
favour of the Ministry of Culture (Cour des Comptes, 22). 
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13 For an analysis using the neo-institutionalist terms of ‘mimetic’, ‘normative’ and 
‘coercitive’ isomorphism, see Musselin (2017). 
14 Spending on external audiovisual provision progressed relatively steadily from 286 million 
euros in 2007 to 319 million euros in 2012 and 342 million euros in 2018 (figures taken from 
budget breakdowns for each year’s loi de finances initiale, available at 
https://www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr/ ). The figures include funding for RFI, 
TV5 Monde and France 24, and have to be aggregated from streams in different 
‘programmes’, though this operation has become easier since 2015 when dedicated 
programmes (844 and 847) were assigned to France Médias Monde (a holding organisation 
whose principal components are RFI and France 24) and TV5 Monde. This improved internal 
visibility of contributions to international audiovisual programmes is itself a sign of their 
higher profile. 
